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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~fABEL

A. BENCH,
Plaintiff and AppcllcintJ

vs.
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES, a corporation,

Case No.

11105

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit brought to recover on certain policies
of life insurance and by amendments to the complaint,
to recover on certain policies of disability and hospitalization insurance.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the pretrial hearing the court entered an order
S8tting forth the respondent's defense that, as a matter
of law, coverage under Policy 5311848 lapsed on the
thirty-first day following termination from employment
1

and directed respondent to file a motion for summary
judgment so that the Law and Motion Division of th~
court might rule on the validity of this defensP. The
pretrial judge expressly declined to rule on such defense which was set forth in the pleadings and was
raised at the pretrial hearing. The pretrial court gave
the appellant leave to amend her complaint to allege a
cause of action on two additional policies, one being a
policy providing medical and surgical benefits and tlw
other, a disability policy.
Pursuant to such leave of the pretrial court, the
appellant elected to file an amended complaint, setting
forth the two causes of action alleged in the original
complaint, the two causes of action on the above-mentioned policies and a catch-all provision wherein liability
is alleged on "any other insurance or benefit policies."
In accordance with the direction of the pretrial
judge, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, which motion was granted. The Law and Motion Division of the lower court dismissed the complaint
without prejudice. Thereafter, appellant filed a second
amended complaint and on the same day, submitted interrogatories to the respondent. The second amended complaint, aside from an allegation that ''all reqnired notice
of death and the plaintiff's claim was given to the defendant, and all condition precedent to plaintiff's demands and to defendant's liability to plaintiff duly performed," is not materially different from the amended
complaint. A second motion to dismiss was filed and
upon hearing, the Law and Motion Division of the lower
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conrt granted the motion to dismiss and said dismissal
was entered ·with prejudice. Because of the order of
dismissal, the interrogatories referred to above were
not answered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the order of dismissal of the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original complaint as well as the amended and
second amended complaints allege that the appellant is
the surviving widow of Leland E. Bench and that the
said Leland E. Bench died on July 1, 1963. The complaints also allege that the said Leland E. Bench was
terminated from employment by Ajax Press Company
on April 26, 1963. The original complaint sought recovery on "a group life insurance policy." (R-1)
By answer, the respondent set forth the numbers
of two group life insurance policies as well as pertinent
provisions thereof and subsequently furnished reconstructed copies of such policies to the appellant's attorney.
On the question of the decedent's disability, it appears from the appellant's deposition that he suffered
an injury while on the job. "He had bumped his left
h·g on a piece of pipe or something they had worked
on down there." (Page 4 of appellant's deposition.) This
"hump" according to appellant's deposition caused him
to han an infection and completely incapacitated him.
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r:l'he '"bump" i8 also described as 2% inches long and
"it looks like it would be about between a half inch or
three-quarter8 of an inch deep, 8omething like that. It
was t1uite deep." (Appellant'8 depo8ition, Page 18.)
Appellant fnrtlwr testified in her depo8ition that thl·
leg was bleeding at the time her lnrnband came hoirn·
from 'Nork, that she put clean bandages on it, but that
her husband did not see a doctor. This injury occurred
on Monday and her husband returned to \rnrk the following Friday, April 2G, 1963. On that day, his employment
was terminated. 'rhe appellant's deposition continues to
the effect that for another week, her husband, the decedent, was totally disahlPd and remained bedridden until
he was admitted to the County Hospital as an out-patient
on either the 2nd or 5th of .May, 1963. From the initial
visit at the County Hospital until the Thursday before
the first of .July, the decedent was treated on an outpatient basis, initially every week, and subsequently,
every two weeks. On the Thursday before July 1, 1963,
the insured was admitted as a patient at the hospital
and died on July 1, 1963.
It was only with the filing of the amended complaint
that respondent was apprised that the appellant was
claiming anything by virtue of the hospital-medical policy or the disability policy. Appellant endeavors to make
much of the fact that the respondent refused to divulge
the existence of these latter policies. As will appPar in
the Argument hereafter, respondent had no reason to
helievP that sn<'h polieies were pertinent or had any bearing on the matters sd forth in the complaint.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN CONSIDERING THE MOTION TO DISMISS, THE
LAW AND MOTION DIVISION FOLLOWED THE
PRETRIAL ORDER.

Appellant's argument on Point I proceeds from a
false premises: That the Law and Motion Division ignored the pretrial order. Respondent respectfully submits that the pretrial order speaks for itself and constitutes simply a delineation of the issues by the pretrial
judge as such issues were reflected by the pleadings
lwfore the pretrial court. As revealed by the pretrial
order itself, the judge declined to pass on questions
of law and took the position that it was incumbent on
the parties to "exhaust the remedy" of a motion for
summary judgment before the Law and Motion Division.

In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Law and
Motion Division of the lower court did not ignore the
pretrial order since the pretrial order did not purport
to pass upon any questions of law or fact but merely
sd forth the issues as they appeared from the pleadings
which were then on file.
POINT II
DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
WAS PROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The appellant combines the arguments against dismissal of the various counts of the second amended
complaint. Respondent submits that since each count of
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the complaint presents differing legal or factual questions, the arguments may more prorwrly be made und('r
separate headings.
Policy Number 5311848 is the group life insurance
policy referred to in the First Cause of Action. The
appellant quotes a portion of the language from this
policy and we respectfully ref er the Court to the policy
itself for the full language thereof with respect to conversions and, also, terminations. This language appears
on the white photostatic copy page~, the page bearing a
penned number 9 in the lower right-hand corner.
There is no dispute as to the fact of termination
of employment. The appellant has alleged in three complaints that the decedent was terminated from employment and testified in her deposition that the deceased
received a blue slip and was terminated from employment. There is no question that the insured died more
than thirty-one (31) days following termination from
employment. We respectfully submit that the contract
i8 unambiguous and clear. As a matter of law, it must
be held that all insurance coverage under Policy 5311848
had ceased and terminated at the date of insured's death.
The appellant cites cases dealing with extension provisions and termination rights and the respondent does
not quarrel with the rules of law laid down in such
cases. The case of Powell vs. Equitable Life Assurancr
Society, 173 S. C. 50, 174 S.E. 649, involves a question
6

of temporary lay-offs. 'l'he p1incipal issue in that case
was whether the insured was still employed at the date
of her death or whether she was on a temporary lay-off.
In l<Jqititable Life Assura11ce Society vs. lloovcr,
1~7 Okla. 134, 101 P.2d 632, the death of the employee
occurred during the thirty-one day period for conversion
of the policy to other insurance. That policy, differing
from the one here invoked, did not expressly provide
tliat coverage ceased on the thirty-first day following
termination. The court simply held that during the thirtyone day conversion period, there was an extension of
coverage. No doubt, the respondent here who was the
defendant in the Hoover case drafted Policy Number
5311848 with the decision of that case in mind since the
extension expressly coincides with the conversion period.

Likewise the case of Atlas Life lnsitrance Company
rs. Miles, 195 Okla. 645, 161 P.2d 1022, involves a situation where the insured died during the conversion period.
On the authority of the Hoover case, the result was the
same.
Also, in the case of Shanks vs. Travelers Insurance
Co111pany, (Okl. D.C.), 25 F.Snpp. 740, the situation inYolvPd a death during the thirty-one day conversion period. In the Shanks case, the employee died the day
following her termination from employment and the
eomt held, as in the previous cases, that the thirty-one
day conversion period effected an extension of coverage.
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The case of Stunner vs. Travelers lnsurcincc Company, 279 Illinois App. G07, is a situation where the sole
issue was whether the decedent had bPen temporarily
laid off or whether he was terminated from employment.
In argument following the citation of this case, appellant is apparently contending for the first time that there
is a quesion in this case whether the decedent was terminated from employment. This, notwithstanding the allegation of termination contained in three complaints and
appellant's testimony in her deposition as to termination
of employment. We respectfully urge that this case
must be confined to the record before the Court. 'rl1ere
is no issue on the question of whether Leland Bench
was terminated from employment. It has been so alleged
and the allegation is admitted.
We would make the same comment with respect to
the case of Travelers Insurance Company vs. Fox, 155
l\Id. 210, 141 Atl. 547, which is cited by appellant. Such,
also, is the burden of the case of Peters vs. Aetna Life
Insurance Company, 279 Mich. 663, 273 N.W. 307. It
should be pointed out that all of these cases involve
a factual question as to whether decedent was laid off
temporarily or was terminated, and the death occurred
within a period of not less than thirty-one days.
As appears from the foregoing review, the cases
cited by appellant fall into two categories. One group
of cases holds that where there is a (1uestion as to
whether the insured was terminatt>d from Pmployment,
there is a question of fact, and some of the cases hold

8

that tlw bnrd0n of proving a termination i8 on the immranr,e company. Tlwre i8 no snch factual question in this
case.
The other group of cases holds that there i8 insurance coverage during a thirty-one day convPrsion period
provided hy the policy. 'l'hat is not denied in this ca::;e
since the policy itself expressly provides that the insurance shall n~main in force for thirty-one days following
the employee's termination.
\Ve note the interesting argument advanced by appellant that since there is a thirty-one day period within
which to convert the policy to permanent insurance and
the policy is in force during that period by express provisions, a reasonable time should be allowed thereafter.
No cases are cited in support of such a novel contention
and in view of the express provisions of the policy, we
submit that no such cases exist. V\T e also note the proposed inforence that the decedent '.vould have exercised
this converson privilege had he been notified thereof or
had knowledge of the same. Regarding the matter of the
decedent's knowledge of coverage, the appellant, in her
deposition, states that she had a certificate of life insurance. (Appellant's deposition, Page 16). It would be
immaterial whether the certificate in appellant's posses:o-:ion "'as on Polic:v fl31184S or 0486, since both certificates
sPt forth substantially identical conversion privileges.
POINT III
DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
WAS PROPER. THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF FACT
ON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT DIFFER.
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The Second Cause of Action involvt·s Policy Numbl•r
0486A and we respectfully refer the Court to the copy
of the policy produced, the page with the notation in
the right-hand corner, number 27, which contains an t'Xtended death benefit. The provision states that:
"If due proof of the death of an t>mployeP
shall be submitted in writing to the Society within
one (1) year after the death of such employee
whose insurance hereunder shall have terminated
due to termination of employment in accordance
with the provisions hereof entitled 'Individual
Terminations,' the Society will pay to the person
or persons entitled thereto under the provisions
of this policy the amount of the insurance for
which such employee's life was last insured under
this policy, provided due proof shall be furnished
to the Society that * * *. At the date of such
termination of employment, such employee was
totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so
as to be prevented from engaging in any occupation for compensation or profit and that such
total disability continued from such termination
of employment to such death * * *."

The ommitted provisions of the extended death benefit clause are not applicable to the instant case.
Looking now to the evidence before the trial court
regarding disability, we refer to appellant's deposition,
Page 4, Line 11,

"Q.

What was Mr. Bench's state of health at that
time~

"A.

He bumped his left leg on a piece of pipn
or something they had worked on down there.
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"Q.

That ·would be on the joM

"A.

On the job.

"Q. ·what

wa~

·t1w affrct of the hump?

"A.

It caused him to ham infection. It was mflamed.

"Q.

When did this accident occur? How long before his termination~

"A.

Monday before termination.

"Q.

Do you know whether Mr. Bench made a report of this occurrence to anyone at Ajax
Presses?

"A.

Yes, he made a report to the - what do you
call them - it was something to do with your
health and accident, something like that.

"Q.

Do yon know the name of the-? You don't
know the name of the individual, do you?

"A.

I can't think of it.

"Q.

Would it be Mr. Blake, the personnel manager1

"A.

No, it was not Mr. Blake. It was the one
for the -.

"Q. It would be the deal with safety.

some person who had to

"A.

It is some person they had to deal with safety
-yes.

"Q.

Safety or first-aid

"A. Yes.
11

measures~

"Q.

Did Ajax PrPsses ban a company doctor for
the employees?

"A.

Dr. Burnham.

"Q.

Dr. Burnham. Did your husband consult Dr.
Burnham after his accident 1

"A.

After he got the blue slip, he wasn't entitled
to.

"Q.

Did he consult Dr. Burnham af er the acc1denU

"A.

No. He got the blue slip.

"Q.

Do you know the day of the week the blue
slip was given to him 1

"A.

Friday.

"Q.

So that the accident occurred on Monday but
you didn't consult Dr. Burnham between that
time and the end of the week?

"A.

No. He couldn't get an appointment.

"Q.

Did he work the rest of the week? From Monday until Friday?

"A.

No, he did not.

"Q.

What was the condition of Mr. Bench's leg
that this bump would cause such difficulty,
Mrs. Bench?

"A.

Just started infected and blood poison."

Giving further details of the nature and extent of the
injury on Page 7, Line 6,
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"Q. Did he show you a bruise or cut on his leg1
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q.

Did yon see his

"A.

Yes.

leg~

"Q. ·was there a cut there?
"A.

There was a cut.

"Q. First of all, which leg was it on, Mrs. Bench?
"A. The left leg.

"Q. His left

leg~

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

About where on the left leg, Mrs.

"A.

Just a little west -

"Q.

How high up on the leg from the ankle would
it be~

"A.

About where you have your hand. Would
that be, say, a foot from the floor~ My judgment of measurements that way is no good."

Bench~

left of his shin bone.

Apparently, appellant is somewhat confused about
the activities of her deceased husband following the injury since at Page 12, Line 30:

"Q.

I may have asked you this before, Mrs. Bench,
but I am not certain of it: Between the time
of the accident which took place on Monday,
April 26, which you say was a Friday, did
your husband work continuously his regular
shift at Ajax~

"A.

Oh, yes.
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''Q.

But .yon an' not sm·p wlwt11Pr it was durin"
that iwriod or after tlw tPrmination that this
man called to talk to you about tlw accident
or called on yonr husband?

"A.

No, I don't. Mr. Bench showt>d him his lPg
and he said it was an awfully nasty looking
leg."

/"")

On cross-Pxamination, appellant wPnt into considerable more detail regarding the Pxtent and natnre of
the injnry, stating at Page 18:

''lt is about two and a half inches long. It
looks like it would be between a half-inch or
three-quarters of an inch deep, something like
that. It was cut quite deep.

"Q.

Through the skin?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Had he had it dressed at that time?

"A.

No.

"Q.

Any bandage over it?

"A.

No. He came right home.

"Q. It was bleeding."
Continuing on Page 19, Line 5,

"Q.

Did he got to work the following day1

"A.

No, sir.

"Q.

When did he

"A.

The following Friday.

m~xt
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go to the plant?

''Q.

What time did he leave then~

"A.

He left at 6 :30 in the morning to get down
there at 7 :00 a.m.

''Q.

What time was he back?

"A.

Back about - not -

"Q.

The reason for his not going to work between
those times - Monday and Friday - was
what1

"A.

He injured his leg.

"Q.

When he went to the plant on Friday, did
he go back to work or something else~

"A.

He went back to go to work even if he had
a bad leg.

about 8 :30.

"Q. Is that when he got the blue slip?
"A.

Yes."

It appears from the deposition that the decedent
had been in good health prior to the accident in question
since "We would go out fishing and the like. We would
go out fishing and hiking around." (Appellant's deposition, Page 15, Lines 6 and 9.)

To summarizP appellant's testimony regarding the
nature and extent of the injury, it appears that the decedent suffered a cut approximately two and one-half
inches long and from one-half to three-quarters of an
inch deep on one leg. Whether he worked on Tuesday,
WPdnPsday and Thursday of the week this injury was
sustained is immaterial. On Friday, he felt sufficiently
well so that he dressed himself and went to work. Upon
n•porting for work, he was advised that he was dis15

charged and given his separation notice rt>ferred to in
the d<>position as a "blue slip.'' 'l'herenpon, dececknt
rdurned home, took himself to his bed until such time
as he could qualify to get on the welfare rolls and subs0quently, reported to tlw County Hospital as a wP!fan•
patient for treatment.
Upon such state of the evidence, the Court is askPd
to believe that this injury of a type and severity such as
might have been readily treated with a bandaid completely incapacitated and disabled the decedent, making
it impossible for him to engage in any occupation for
compensation or profit from the 26th of April continuously until the first day of July, at which tinw he
died. The respondent respectfully submits that such vi0w
of the evidence is absolutely incredulous. Reasonable
minds could not differ that such injury as is described
in detail in appellant's deposition could not haw resulted in total disability for such an extended period of
time. This view of the evidence coincide with the deceased's own conduct. Four days after the injur>', he
felt sufficiently recovered to dress himself and report
for work. Obviously, the deceased did not consider himself totally disabled on Friday, April 26, 1963, thP day
he was discharged. Neither did Larry Blake, the Personnel Manager at Ajax Presses, who twice visited tlw
Bench home, as set forth in Mr. Blake's affidavit (R. 5657). Appellant now asks this Court, in the face of such
evidence and the behavior of the deceased himself, to
hold that on Friday, April 26, the decedent ·was totally
disabled.
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This Court has many times considered the scope of
n~vif~W npon an appeal from granting a summary judgn1ent. Apparently, the last of such cases is that of Jose
F. ill onto ya vs. Berthana Investment Corporation, ct al,
DECIDED April 17, 19GS, 'dwrein this Court, upon
reviewing the pleadings, states
''These were allegations - not proof. By employing the discover:r process under the rules,
by affidavit and interrogatories directed to each
party by the other, there developed a clear departure from pleading and proof, that precipitated no genuine issue of fact, but one of law
based on the evidence submitted by both parties
before trial."
A summary judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
The burden of the cases would appear to be that the
state of evidence must be such from pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and any other evidentiary matters before the trial court, that reasonable minds might not
differ as to the conclusion which would be reached. For,
as said in Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Company, 16 U.2d
Sl, 395 P.2d 918,

"vV e

are not persuaded that the trial court was
in error in concluding that all reasonable minds
would agree * * *."
Or, as stated in Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company,
1G U.2d 30, 395 P.2d 62,
"Therefore, if there is any reasonable basis in
the evidence upon which n:asonable minds could
conclude that they are not so persuaded on either
of these issues, they should be submitted to trial
by jury * * *." (Emphasis added.)
17

As statPd conversely in the case of Robison
RolJison, 16 C2d 2, 394 P.2d SIG,

1 ·'·

"It is our opinion that these are questions about
which there is sufficient uncertainfr that reaso11ablc minds might differ cu; to their conclusion,
thereo11. It follows that the plaintiff should lw
afforded the opportunity he seeks of presenting
the disputed issuPs in the case to a jury for
determination." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from this Court's decisions that the pleadings alone are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact in
opposition to affidavits or depositions. Continental Bank
& Trust Company i·s. Cu11ningham, 10 U.2d 329, 353 P.2d
168; Dupler i:s. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624.
It is also necessary that there be a ge1rnine issue of
a material fact. In re Williams' Estates, 10 U.2d 83,
348 P.2d 683; Bullock i:s. Descret Dodge Truck Center,
Inc., 11 U.2d 1, 354 P.2d 559.

Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence
before the trial court, as shown by the record herein, presents a situation where reasonable minds could not differ
on the question of the decedent's disability. The affidavit of Larry Blake, together with the appellant's own
deposition, clearly overcome the allegations of the pleadings and show beyond hope of refutation that the decedent 'vas not and could not be claimed as being totall:·
disabled on the day he was discharged from employment.
Whether he thereupon took himself to his bed and n·18

lllained there until some later date is immaterial. He
mnst have been continuously disabled from the date of
hiti termination to the date of his death.
Appellant cites several cases on the question of denial of liability by an insurance carrier as constituting
a waiver of the requirement that a proof of loss be sub1J1itted. Until the filing of the answer to appellant's
original complaint, the record contains no denial of liability by the respondent. In each of the cases cited,
there was no question that the insurance carrier was
notified of a loss and through conduct of its agents or
employees, either lead the claimant to believe that there
was no necessity for further action and that the claim
1rnuld be processed in due course or categorically denied
liability and advised the claimant that there was no
need to submit proof of loss. With the rule of law that
such conduct is a waiver of the requirement that a proof
of loss be submitted, respondent has no quarrel.
The only evidence in this record of any notice given
b~, the appellant of a claim under the policies is contaim'd in answers to interrogatories, Answer Number 6,
"I was a\Yare of some insurance during Mr.
Bench's life. Following his death, I corresponded
with Ajax Press Company, Equitable Life Insurance Company, and the Utah State Insurance
Commission." (Emphasis added.)
Answer Number 8 in response to the question,
"On what date did you notify the defendant of
)'our claim under such policies~
"Within a week after the death of Mr. Bench."

19

It should be noted that appellant has never specified
to whom such ''correspondence" was addressed and if
in fact, the same was addressed to the Equitable Life'
Insurance Company, it was no doubt delivered to that
company and not received by this respondent. The appellant, as revealed by the record, has been very reluctant
to divulge any information to respondent. We call the
Court's attention to the fact that in order to securP
answers to the interrogatories and to secure the signing
and filing of appellant's deposition, it was necessary for
the respondent to file a motion for dismissal based on
failure to sign and file the deposition and to answer the
interrogatories. (R. 26). At the time this motion was
filed, it had been more than one year since the deposition was taken and the interrogatories submitted. The
answers were filed the day before the hearing on the
motion and the deposition signed and filed sometime after
that.
The respondent submits that there is no evidence
before the Court either as to notice of a claim given to
respondent or as to a denial of liability prior to the
filing of this action, either on Policy 0486A or any of
the other policies involved in this matter. Respondent
further submits that regardless of this defense, as shown
by the evidence and pleadings herein, respondent has a
good and valid defense to each count of the appellant's
second amended complaint and, therefore, the issue as
to the giving of notice or denial of liability is not a genuine issue of a material fact.
20

POINT IV
AS A MATTER OF LAW, COUNTS III AND IV OF THE
COMPLAINT FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
~'he second amended complaint alleges in Counts III
and I\' in almost identical language the existence of a
policy of hispitalization and medical coverage being Policy 0846H and a disability policy being 0846W. Copies of
these policies were produced pursuant to Paragraph 6 of
the lower court's pretrial order on June 15, 1967 (R. 43)
and are part of the file. These policies are exceedingly
bulky since there are attached various provisions covering t>pecific divisions of the group which were insured
and provided varying and different benefits for the different insured groups of employees. As set forth in the
ap1wllant's brief, it is the respondent's position that
claims under both of these policies are barred for failure
to comply with the limitation requirements contained
therein. The surgical and hospital policy provides that
proof and notice of claim must be presented within
ninety (90) days after the period of hospitalization, confinement or surgical operation (p. 42). The disability
policy provides that proof must be submitted within
ninety (90) days (p. 12). References are to written
numbers appearing at the bottom of the photographic
copies of the policy pages.

Aside, however, from the question of limitations, it
is and has been the respondent's position from the outset
that the terms of these policies expressly exclude the
daim urged by appellant. Refoning to Policy 0846H (all
l'Pforences being to the handwritten numbers at the bot21

tom of each page of the photographic copies), Pages 32
through 38, inclusive, contain limitation provisiom; with
respect to hospital and surgical benefits for variou~
classes of insured employees. In each instance and on
each of the pages referred to is the provision that no
payment shall be made for hospital benefits or surgical
benefits incurred due to accidental bodily injuries arising .
out of and in the course of employee's employment. Similar language appears at Pages 10 and 11 of Policy 0486W.
Respondents, therefore, respectfully submits that the
terms of the policies themselves exclude the claim now
urged on behalf of the decedent who, according to Mrs.
Bench's deposition, was injured on the job and such
injury resulted in his disability and later hospital confinement and surgical procedures. Injury, disability and
hospital confinement arising from such causes are simply
excluded from the policy coverage and the employee
would be left to his remedy under Workmen's Compensation Act.
In addition, under Policy 0846H, by the terms of
the policy itself, coverage is limited to amounts actitally
incurred by the insured. At Page 32 is the provision
that there may be paid, following proof of confinement
to a hospital "the amount of charges for hospital room
and board incurred during such hospital confinement
* * *." With regard to surgical benefits, Page 36 contains the language that payment will be made if there is
proof of an operation having been performed "for surgical fees incurred for such operation."
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'l'he appellant advances an interesting argument to
the effect that respondent may not claim as a defense
the fact that the decedent actually incurred no hospital
and medical expenses and states that any recovery on
this cause of action would be turned over to the Salt
Lake County ~W l'lfare. Vv ere this a tort case, the fact
that the appellant and her deceased husband had suffered
no monetary loss might well be no defense to respondent.
\Ve are here dealing, however, with a contract of insurance which is clear, specific and not subject to any ambiguity. The contract simply does not cover any hospital
confinement or surgical operation except charges actually incurred by the insured.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion and to summarize respondent's
position:
1. The Law and Motion Division of the lower court
followed the Pretrial Order in ruling on respondent's
Motion to Dismiss.
2. Dismissal of the First Cause of Action was necessary as a matter of law since all coverage lapsed on
the thirty-first day following termination of employment.
3. Dismissal of the Second Cause of Action was
proper as there was no material issue of fact on which
l'C'asonahlc minds might differ.
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4. Dismissal of Counts III and IV of the second
amended complaint as a matter of law was proper since ,
the policy provisions expressly exclude coverage of accidents sustained in the course of employment and disability resulting from sulch accidents.

1

We respectfully urge that the Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice entered by the lower court should be
affirmed with costs to the respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
Wallace D. Hurd of
Bayle, Hurd and Lauchnor
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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